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Could Australia and NZ Survive a Global Catastrophe

7 min read
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Kai Vector

The short answer: Nowhere is truly “safe.” Australia and New Zealand may be relatively better placed to keep growing food after a large nuclear war—but they are not the only possibilities, and survival would be hard, not guaranteed.

The longer story is more complicated—more frightening in some ways, more nuanced in others. The most viral claims about Annie Jacobsen’s 72‑minute doomsday scenario bend the truth at the worst places. Here’s what the evidence really shows, and what we still don’t know.

What the headlines got wrong first: the five‑billion figure The most striking correction is also the most important. Jacobsen’s book does not say five billion people die “within 72 minutes.” That number—more than five billion—is drawn from peer‑reviewed food‑system modeling of a U.S.–Russia nuclear war, and refers to deaths over the following years, mostly from famine triggered by “nuclear winter,” not from the initial blasts. The 2022 Nature Food analysis by Xia, Robock, Toon, Heneghan and colleagues projects soot‑driven cooling and rainfall declines that crash global harvests, livestock and fisheries—leading to multibillion‑person famine in the years after a full exchange, not in the first hour. Source: Nature Food study summary at PubMed (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37118594/?utm_source=openai)

That doesn’t make Jacobsen’s clock less terrifying. It makes it more real. The first hour is about physics and procedures. The following years are about hunger.

Inside the 72-minute clock Jacobsen’s scenario, as she’s described in interviews and reviews, is built from what we know about missile flight times, early‑warning systems, and decision protocols—not as a prediction, but as a plausible chain of events.

Jacobsen’s narrative begins with a North Korean strike, a U.S. response overflying Russia, and a Russian misinterpretation that triggers an all‑out exchange. That sequence, while fictionalized, aligns with how experts say miscalculation could escalate. Source: Arms Control Association review (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-06/book-reviews/nuclear-war-scenario?utm_source=openai)

What a big bomb actually does—and what depends on conditions In podcasts, Jacobsen describes a 1‑megaton detonation, a fireball at “180 million degrees,” “everything on fire” inside a nine‑mile diameter, and overlapping firestorms of 100–200 square miles.

Here’s the nuance:

For the technical baseline, see Glasstone & Dolan’s U.S. DoD reference (https://atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/effects/glasstone-dolan/chapter2.html?utm_source=openai). Jacobsen’s framing is directionally right about the horror; the details are scenario‑dependent.

The real killer arrives after the flashes: food collapse This is where the science is strongest—and sobering. The Nature Food work modeling soot lofted into the stratosphere finds:

Under a U.S.–Russia all‑out war scenario, the authors estimate more than five billion could die from famine and related effects over subsequent years. Source: Nature Food at PubMed (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37118594/?utm_source=openai)

Other studies warn of prolonged ozone loss after even regional nuclear conflicts, boosting UV radiation and damaging ecosystems. The upshot: indirect effects multiply the death toll far beyond the blast zones.

So where could still grow food? This is where a second viral claim needs tempering. Jacobsen has repeated an anecdote that “only two countries”—Australia and New Zealand—could sustain agriculture after a severe nuclear winter. The peer‑reviewed evidence points to a wider, if still very short, list.

A Risk Analysis study assessing 38 island countries under abrupt sunlight‑reducing catastrophes (including nuclear winter) identifies Australia and New Zealand as relatively well placed—but also flags Iceland, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu as potentially resilient, with big caveats. Source: Risk Analysis at PubMed (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36464495/?utm_source=openai)

Country‑level analyses echo the “more survivable, not safe” message. New Zealand, for example, could on paper feed its population by diverting exports even under severe yield declines—but only if fuel, spare parts, fertilizer substitutes, and logistics are managed under extreme stress. Source: New Zealand Medical Journal (https://nzmj.org.nz/journal/vol-136-no-1574/food-security-during-nuclear-winter-a-preliminary-agricultural-sector-analysis-for-aotearoa-new-zealand?utm_source=openai)

Why Australia and New Zealand often top the list:

Why that may still not be enough:

In other words, “safer” means “less catastrophically exposed,” not “safe.”

What’s solid about Jacobsen—and what isn’t

A quick claims and corrections snapshot

How we know what we know For this piece, we cross‑checked Jacobsen’s statements against:

What remains uncertain

Why this story matters Jacobsen’s core message survives the fact‑check and may be more urgent because of it. The first hour of a nuclear war is faster than politics. The worst of its killing would come later, through cold and hunger. A few places—Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, and some Pacific islands—may have better odds of keeping people fed. None has a free pass without preparation.

“Unacceptable damage” is the antiseptic phrase that underpins deterrence. Spell it out and it looks like this: minutes to decide; years to starve. If we want the last sentence of this story never to be written, the time to fix brittle systems and reduce nuclear risks is now.